Spinoza in de Cadernos de História e Filosofia da Ciência
Na ruim zes weken had de AAS eindelijk weer eens een bericht. Ze hadden een artikel ontdekt over Boyle en Spinoza in het Braziliaanse tijdschrift Cadernos de História e Filosofia da Ciência, dat PDF's biedt van de artikelen.
U mag van dit blog ietsje meer verwachten. Ik ga meteen kijken of er nog meer artikelen zijn die aspecten van de filosofie van Spinoza behandelen, en die blijken er te zijn. Voor degenen die Portugees lezen, hieronder de auteurs, titels en - indien aanwezig voor de anderen - de samenvattingen in het Engels en het PDF van artikelen over Spinoza (in willekeurige volgorde - en met dank aan de AAS voor de tip):
CRISTIANO NOVAES DE REZENDE, O Estatuto das Hipóteses Científicas na Epistemologia de Espinosa.
Cad. Hist. Fil. Ci., Campinas, Série 3, v. 18, n. 1, p. 147-171, jan.-jun. 2008.
Abstract: The theme to be examined in this article stands at the first part of the methodo-logical program presented by Spinoza in the Tractatus de Intellectus Emendatione (TIE). This part of the method is devoted to distinguish the true idea (idea vera) from all other perceptions, among which fictitious idea (idea ficta) and “the assumptions that are made at the quaestiones” are found. When Spinoza deals with those questions, he mentions, yet very briefly, “hypothesis made to explain certain movements which agrees (conveniunt) with the celestial phenomena”. This brief passage, found at the second note from §57 (Bruder’s numbering), constitutes the textual core that the present article intends to eluci-date, contributing to the comprehension of the epistemic status of the referred hypothesis and its role when dealing with empiric objects, such as the “celestial phenomena”. [PDF]
LUCIANA ZATERKA, ROBERT BOYLE E A QUÍMICA EXPERIMENTAL. O Ensaio do Nitro: alguns aspectos relacionados à polêmica com Espinosa
Cad. Hist. Fil. Ci., Campinas, Série 3, v. 11, n. 1, p. 63-80, jan.-jun. 2001.
Abstract: The objective of this paper is to discuss some aspects of the polemic between Boyle and Spinoza. We will analyze a small physical-chemistry essay written by Boyle in 1660: A physico-chymical essay containing an experiment with some considerations touching the differing parts and redintegration of salt-pete. In this text, Boyle shows how the salitre can be decomposed by the fire in volatile nitre and fixed nitre and, still, how those parts can been able to join for form the original substance again. So, Boyle believed that the salitre was a heterogeneous substance constituted by two substances with different physical and chemical properties. Here our chemist presents his corpuscular theory, dismantling the theory of the substantial forms.
In the correspondence between Espinosa and Oldenburg we can notice where is the polemic between the author of the Ethics and our chemist: for Espinosa the nitro and the two decomposed “parts” only differed in its mechanical properties, not surpassing the “physical-mechanic” paradigm. We intended to show that the difference among the two thinkers appears as difference among a natural science a priori (a mathematical physics) and a natural science a posteriori (an experimental chemistry) that presuppose differences in the substance and cause concepts. [PDF]
LUCIANA ZATERKA, OS LIMITES DO PROJETO EPISTEMOLÓGICO DE ROBERT BOYLE: AS VERDADES ACIMA DA RAZÃO. Cad. Hist. Fil. Ci., Campinas, Série 3, v. 12, n. 1-2, p. 209-223, jan.-dez. 2002.
Abstract: In 1640, when Robert Boyle was 13, he suffered a singular religious experience that marked his life and propitiated his conversion. Since then, Boyle will lead his life according to Christian belief. This deep religiosity will reflect on his work. From this point of view, we intended to analyze the influence of that religiosity and of the theology in his epistemological enterprise. We shall verify that his interest on natural philosophy was of a widen purpose: the knowledge of God through his works. Thus, being a virtuous Christian, Boyle built his epistemological project taking into account the well-being, the structure of the natural world and, above all, the divine plan of the creation. Here the idea of ordinary course of nature is the compass of the natural philosophy. Therefore he sets clear limits for the human understanding; in other words, the human reason is not sovereign. Stressing these limits the philosopher introduces his theory of the double-truth. [PDF]
MARILENA CHAUI, IMPERIUM OU MODERATIO? Cad. Hist. Fil. Ci., Campinas, Série 3, v. 12, n. 1-2, p. 9-43, jan.-dez. 2002.
Abstract: For Spinoza, freedom is the identity of one to oneself. He demonstrates that the conatus is the only foundation of virtue, because it is precisely the force of the body and the mind to affirm themselves as adequate cause (or internal and total cause) of their actions. Thus, his refusal of the Cartesian thesis that beyond reason there is a imperium absolutum of the will over passions. Spinoza affirms the moderatio as the expression of the mind’s power (potentia mentis) or imperium rationis, wich moderates the force of the affects. [PDF]
MARCOS ANDRÉ GLEIZER, Considerações sobre a definição de eternidade na Ética de Espinosa. Cad. Hist. Fil. Ci., Campinas, Série 3, v. 19, n. 1, p. 37-60, jan.-jun. 2009.
Abstract: The paper offers an analysis of Spinoza’s definition of eternity proposed in the first part of the Ethics (EI def. VIII), trying to establish the legitimacy of its univocal application to God and its modes. For that purpose, the paper tries to show how the formulation of that definition authorizes a distinction between what is eternal in virtue of its own essence and what is eternal in virtue of its eternal cause, showing also that this distinction does not concern two distinct kinds of eternity, but just two distinct causes or reasons for the attribution of one and the same kind of eternity to different things. To clarify this crucial point, the paper deals with the connections existing between the concept of eternity and that of necessary existence, trying to show how Spinoza’s theory of eternity can be illuminated by its articulation with his necessitarianism. [PDF]
LIA LEVY, Afetividade e Fluxo de Consciência: uma hipótese de inspiração espinosista. Cad. Hist. Fil. Ci., Campinas, Série 3, v. 18, n. 1, p. 121-146, jan.-jun. 2008.
Abstract: The article proposes a conception of the flow of conscience based on a non-materialistic metaphysical model of naturalization of the conscience, inspired in Spinoza's philosophy. I will try to answer Arthur Prior’s question (“Thank Goodness That s Over”; 1959) concerning the problematic character of the meaning of a certain type of propositions containing temporal indexes for the theories that refuse the reality of time. My hypothesis is that those propositions cannot be reduced to tenseless ones since their meaning is determined by the adverbial character of the temporal indexes and since they express subjective referentially opaque states (that are taken to be close to the spinozis-tic concept of affection). I will also show that their function is crucial for the constitution of the mental and for the reality of the practical domain. [PDF]
DÉBORAH DANOWSKI, INDIFERENÇA, SIMETRIA E PERFEIÇÃO SEGUNDO LEIBNIZ. Cad. Hist. Fil. Ci., Campinas, Série 3, v. 12, n. 1-2, p. 149-170, jan.-dez. 2002.
Abstract: In the Theodicy, Leibniz presents three different solutions to the Buridan’s sophism, in particular, and more generally, to the problem of the liberty of indifference. The first criticizes the idea that, even in a situation of perfect equilibrium and complete absence of a determining reason, men (as opposed to irrational animals) would be able to act. The other two deny the very possibility of perfect equilibrium and symmetry in the universe, such that this sophism looses its meaning. [PDF]
MARILENA CHAUI, A DEFINIÇÃO REAL NA ABERTURA DA ÉTICA I DE ESPINOSA. Cad. Hist. Fil. Ci., Campinas, Série 3, v. 11, n. 1, p. 07-28, jan.-jun. 2001.
Abstract: This paper does not consider the eight definitions of the first part of Spinoza’s Ethics as nominal definitions but intends to present such definitions as forming one and only one real definition of God which is the result of a geometrical construction from the other definitions as its elements. [PDF]
MOYSÉS FLORIANO MACHADO-FILHO, A GÊNESE DOS OBSTÁCULOS EPISTEMOLÓGICOS E PASSIONAIS À BEATITUDE NO PRÓLOGO DO TRACTATUS DE INTELLECTUS EMENDATIONE DE ESPINOSA.Cad. Hist. Fil. Ci., Campinas, Série 3, v. 11, n. 1, p. 121-142, jan.-jun. 2001.
Abstract: This article intends to deal with the epistemological and passives obstacles to the beatitude in the opening of Spinoza's Tractatus de Intellectus Emendatione, showing the conciliation between the rhetorical and epistemic discourses in the author's exposition. In order to do so, we tried to demonstrate that the philosopher doesn't produce a rupture in his work by a merely rhetorical introduction of the problem, but he supplies, from the introduction, the mathematical genesis of desire, thus elaborating an epistemology. [PDF]
CRISTIANO NOVAES DE REZENDE, OS PERIGOS DA RAZÃO SEGUNDO ESPINOSA:
A INADEQUAÇÃO DO TERCEIRO MODO DE PERCEBER NO TRATADO DA EMENDA DO INTELECTO. Cad. Hist. Fil. Ci., Campinas, Série 3, v. 14, n. 1, p. 59-118, jan.-jun. 2004.
Resumo: O objetivo do presente artigo é investigar o sentido da inadequação atribuída por Espinosa, no Tratado da Emenda do Intelecto, ao “terceiro modo de perceber” (também chamado “razão” no Breve Tratado e na Ética). Para tanto, mobilizarei noções componentes da teoria espinosana da definição, conceitualmente relacionadas – como parâmetro contraposto – ao tema da inadequação aqui em pauta. Além disso, também pretendo explorar o papel da referência que Espinosa faz, nesse contexto, aos Elementos de Euclides. E por fim, a título de conclusão, indicarei algumas possíveis conseqüências dessa ressalva feita à razão para uma caracterização do sentido histórico mais amplo do racionalismo espinosano. [PDF]
MARCOS ANDRÉ GLEIZER, Primeiras Considerações sobre o Problema da Explicação
Teleológica da Ação Humana em Espinosa. Cad. Hist. Fil. Ci., Campinas, Série 3, v. 16, n. 1, p. 163-198, jan.-jun. 2006.
Resumo: Uma das principais controvérsias que dividem os estudiosos do pensamento de Espino-sa refere-se à determinação do alcance exato de sua crítica à doutrina das causas finais. Embora todos concordem que esta crítica acarreta a recusa radical de qualquer explicação teleológica da ação di-vina, o debate surge quando se trata de determinar se ela também acarreta a exclusão de toda e qual-quer forma de explicação teleológica do comportamento dos entes finitos e, em particular, do ser huma-no. Neste artigo pretendo apresentar um primeiro exame de algumas das principais evidências a favor dos intérpretes que sustentam que nem as formulações textuais de Espinosa nem seus argumentos ex-cluem a legitimidade de explicações teleológicas da ação humana. [PDF]