Hermann Lotze (1817 - 1881) stookte een brouwsel van Spinoza en Leibniz tot eigen psychologische theorie

Aanleiding voor dit blog is het boek van

Frederick C. Beiser, Late German Idealism: Trendelenburg and Lotze. Oxford University Press, 2013, 333pp., ISBN 9780199682959 - books.google - Review op NDPR

een studie over de twee belangrijkste idealistische filosofen in Duitsland na Hegel; centrale figuren in de academische filosofie van het 19e eeuwse Duitsland, die grote invloed hadden op Frege, Brentano, Dilthey, Kierkegaard, Cohen, Windelband en Rickert.

Daar ik over Trendelenburg al eerder, in 2010, twee blogs had [cf. en cf.], waarvoor Beiser toen trouwens ook de aanleiding vormde, focus ik hier alleen op Lotze. Lotze heeft niet zoals Trendelenburg apart over Spinoza geschreven, maar heeft zich wel met Spinoza bezig gehouden en hem - aangepast - in zijn psychologie geïntegreerd, zoals zo dadelijk zal blijken. Tot in de jaren 1920 behoorde hij tot de bekendste en meest besproken Duitse filosofen. Ook in het buitenland genoot hij een grote reputatie. George Santayana (1863 - 1952) b.v. promoveerde op een dissertatie over hem [cf.]. Vergeleken met de protagonisten van het Duitse idealisme en de bekendste filosofen van de 19e eeuw, die meestal buiten de academische traditie werkten, is hij tegenwoordig veel minder bekend. [cf. wiki). Maar ooit was hij "the most fascinating, eccentric, and neglected figures in modern German intellectual history." [Roger Chickering, bij Chan, cf. hierna]

Rudolf Hermann Lotze studeerde medicijnen en filosofie aan de universiteit van Leipzig (1834–38), waarbij hij fysische processen als essentieel mechanisch beschouwde. Na kort als medicus gewerkt te hebben concentreerde hij zich op filosofie dat hij in Leipzig ging doceren (1842–44), waarna hij professor werd, de langste tijd in Göttingen (1844–80) en kort in Berlijn (1881).

Lotze was de grootste metafysicus sinds Hegel, maar eigenlijk wilde hij de metafysica afschaffen door ze te integreren in de wetenschap, waarbinnen hij fysica en psychologie als gelijkwaardig zag. Hij was zo een van de grondleggers van de moderne psychologie, tot wie G. Stanley Hall (1844 - 1924) in zijn Founders of modern psychology (1912, archive.org) rekende: Eduard Zeller (1814-1908); Hermann Lotze (1817-1881); Gustav Theodor Fechner (1801-1887); Eduard von Hartmann (1842-1906); Hermann von Helmholtz (1821-1894); Wilhelm Max Wundt (1832-1920). Hij was dus een van de pioniers die de psychologie (toen ook wel psychofysica genoemd) tot een autonome discipline maakten.

Als z'n hoofdwerken kunnen worden beschouwd: Logik (1843), Mikrokosmos, 3 Theile (1856–64), en Metaphysik (1879). [cf z'n werk bij archive.org]

En Spinoza?

Peter M. K. Chan beschrijft wat Lotze met Spinoza deed in zijn The Mystery of Mind: A Systematic Account of the Human Mind Toward Understanding Its Own Realization [iUniverse, 2003 - books.google ] aldus

In his [Lotze's] view, the infinite substance of Spinoza should be understood as constituted of ultimate entities of an atomic kind. And these are not to be construed as atoms merely in the accepted physical sense of the term, but entities of a sentient nature, or sentient atoms, if you like. In other words, what Lotze did in effect was to turn Spinoza's two-aspect theory into a kind of atomic two-aspect theory. This is also the original version of what is usually referred to as panpsychism, (not to be confused with the monadology of Leibniz of which we shall have something else to say in the next Chapter). But how had Lotze really helped? Well, to me at least, it points to the possibility that the two problems just alluded [unconsciousness & that all things are actually psychic in some way] may be able to be dealt with in terms of two qualifications. One is that psychic aspect may have to be understood as coming in various grades (ranging from the very dim to the full-blown mentality of a human being) depending on the atomic organization concerned. Another is that if and when certain complex atomic organizations such as body-brains are out of whack for one reason or another, it is possible for them to lose consciousness of the living kind.

Uit deze beschrijving blijkt dat Chan toch niet goed door heeft gehad hoe Lotze Spinoza door de bril van Leibniz heeft geïnterpreteerd: dat zijn wat Chan typeerde als "atomic two-aspect theory" meer Leibniz dan Spinoza is.

Als student, waarschijnlijk in 1838, schreef Lotze het essay "Pensees d'un ldiote sur Descartes, Spinoza et Leibnitz". Ik citeer - zonder de verwijzingen - wat Beiser hierover schrijft:

"This essay, written in poetic but imperfect French, is partly an historical account of Descartes', Spinoza's and Leibniz's solutions to the mind-body problem; but, more importantly, it is also an argument in behalf of Leibniz's solution. It is in Lotze's defense of Leibniz that the chief interest of the essay lies; for Lotze would later say that he was led to his own philosophy by walking through "the door of the Leibnizian world of monads". What door led him into that fanciful and fabled realm? It was the same door through which Schelling had walked a generation or so earlier, the door marked "vis viva". Leibniz made this concept the very heart of his ontology, seeing each individual substance as a centre of living force. The entire universe is alive for him, and mind and matter are only different degrees of organization, development and perfection of living force. According to Lotze, Leibniz does not really think that mind and matter are distinct substances which interact solely by virtue of a pre-established harmony ordained by God in the beginning of things; rather, he holds that matter is not a proper substance at all because it consists in nothing more than monads, though, to be sure, monads at their lowest level of activity and in a deep sleep. The essence of each monad consists in its "power of specification", i.e., the particular way in which it realizes and develops its inherent forces. Lone then gives this doctrine a Spinozian twist by claiming that Leibniz makes Spinoza's two attributes, thought and extension, into properties of each monad rather than a single infinite substance. The attribute of extension means that a monad is passive and fills space; and the attribute of thought means that it is active and has the power of self-awareness. But Leibniz's attributes are not completely independent, as they are in Spinoza, because they are capable of interaction with one another. What allows thought to act upon extension, and conversely, is simply the fact that they are different degrees of living force. When the mind perceives a body, for example, it "spiritualizes" that body, i.e., it realizes, organizes and develops the latent and inchoate forces already inherent in the body. The perceptions of the monad therefore constitute the "essence" or "meaning" of the body, because they realize its implicit, inchoate and subconscious forces. It is in Lotze's interpretation of Leibniz that we shall find the key to understanding his own later solution to the mind-body problem, which we will examine below." [p. 146]

Dat Lotze toch ook flink studie heeft gemaakt van Spinoza, blijkt wel uit een passage als de volgende:

"Lotze insists that we should accept the basic phenomenological fact: that mental and physical phenomena are heterogeneous. There are, of course, constant connections between these phenomena, which we can formulate in precise quantitative laws. Still, these connections do not mean that cause and effect are homogeneous with one another; they are indeed very different, because there is no similarity in content between them, such that one could be logically derived from the other, viz., we cannot infer that this light wave must produce just this color. Lotze admits, however, that even though psychic and physical phenomena are logically and phenomenologically distinct from one another, that is still not sufficient reason to infer that they belong to distinct substances. It is still possible that both psychic and physical phenomena, however incomparable, still inhere in a single substance. After all, this was the assumption of Spinoza, who maintained that they are simply different attributes of one and the same thing. Nevertheless, though we can assume in principle such a single substance, Lotze insists that it will not help us to explain the origin of such very distinct phenomena. Though perhaps identical in their origin, they are still very different from one another in their appearance. Since the content of mental and physical phenomena are so incomparable, it is justifiable to assume, though only initially and provisionally, that psychic phenomena have their own unique principle and cause." [p. 218]

________________

Bronnen  [naast die welke al vermeld werden]

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hermann_Lotze

http://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hermann_Lotze  

http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/hermann-lotze/

http://www.iep.utm.edu/lotze/  

VoorkantReinhardt Pester, Hermann Lotze: Wege seines Denkens und Forschen: ein Kapitel deutscher Philosophie- und Wissenschaftsgeschichte im 19. Jahrhundert. Königshausen & Neumann, 1997 - books.google

Ernst Wolfgang Orth, "Die Auffassung des Monadischen bei Rudolf Hermann Lotze." In: Sigmund Bonk (Hrsg), Monadisches Denken in Geschichte und Gegenwart. Königshausen & Neumann, 2003 - books.google